An excerpt from Sun Tzu's "Art of War"
.
3. The Sheathed Sword
IT'S TIME FOR THE BIG SHOW.
REGULATORS.....
,,,,,,,,,,,MOUNT UP
** IT'S TIME TO REGULATE **
8.14.2006
THE WAR TO EMARK ON - THE ART OF WAR
An excerpt from Sun Tzu's "Art of War"
.
3. The Sheathed Sword
IT'S TIME FOR THE BIG SHOW.
REGULATORS.....
,,,,,,,,,,,MOUNT UP
** IT'S TIME TO REGULATE **
To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. In the art of practical war, the best thing of all is to t
ake the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment, or a company entire than to destroy them.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best thing is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities, because of the preparation of mantlets, moveable shelters, and various implements of war will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
The skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdoms without lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he disputes the mastery of the empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph is complete.
This is the method of attacking by stratagem of using the sheathed sword.
It is a rule in war: If our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our number in two, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon the rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly ushed from in front. inferior in number, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in e
very way, we can flee from him. Though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
The general is the bulwark of the state: if the bulwark is strong at all points, the state will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the state will be weak.
There are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army:
By commanding the army to advance or retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions that obtain an army. This causes restlessness in the soldiers’ minds. Humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are military rather than civic virtues.
By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
When the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
He will win who k
nows when to fight and when not to fight.
He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
ake the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment, or a company entire than to destroy them.Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best thing is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities, because of the preparation of mantlets, moveable shelters, and various implements of war will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
The skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdoms without lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he disputes the mastery of the empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph is complete.
This is the method of attacking by stratagem of using the sheathed sword.
It is a rule in war: If our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our number in two, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon the rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly ushed from in front. inferior in number, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in e
very way, we can flee from him. Though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.The general is the bulwark of the state: if the bulwark is strong at all points, the state will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the state will be weak.
There are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army:
By commanding the army to advance or retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions that obtain an army. This causes restlessness in the soldiers’ minds. Humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are military rather than civic virtues.
By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
When the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
He will win who k
nows when to fight and when not to fight.He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
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